4.3 Oracle Staking Economics

Stake Requirements:

struct OracleRequirements {
    min_stake: u64,              // e.g., 10,000 PATH
    commit_period: i64,          // 24-48 hours
    reveal_period: i64,          // 24-48 hours
    dispute_period: i64,         // 48-72 hours
}

Incentive Structure:

Correct Oracle Outcome:
├─> Stake returned
├─> Reward from resolution fee pool
└─> Reputation increase

Incorrect Oracle Outcome (minority):
├─> Stake partially slashed (e.g., 10%)
├─> No rewards
└─> Reputation penalty

Malicious Oracle (failed reveal):
├─> Stake fully slashed (100%)
├─> Banned from future oracle participation
└─> Slashed funds sent to correct oracles

Economic Security:

For a $100,000 market with 10 oracles staking 10,000 PATH each:

Total Oracle Stake:       100,000 PATH

Manipulation Cost:
├─> Need 51% of stake to control outcome
├─> Cost: 51,000 PATH
├─> Plus: reputation loss, future ban
├─> Risk: other oracles dispute, losing all stake

Expected Profit from Manipulation:
├─> Max profit: $100,000 (if own entire losing side)
├─> Realistic: $10,000-$30,000 (partial position)
├─> Net: Negative after stake loss

Conclusion: Manipulation unprofitable